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CASE COMMENTS

the extension of due process to proceedings, which are essentially criminal
in nature, but which traditionally have been denied the safeguards of criminal
35
proceedings.
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TAXPAYER'S STANDING TO SUE
IN FEDERAL COURTS
Flast v. Cohen, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968)
Appellant sought an injunction to block the use of federal funds for
financing guidance services and instruction and for purchasing educational
materials for use in parochial schools. A three-judge federal court dismissed
the complaint,1 holding that appellant lacked standing. On direct appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, that federal taxpayers
have standing to sue to prevent expenditures that exceed the limits imposed
by the establishment clause of the first amendment upon Congress's taxing
and spending power.2 Judgment reversed, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
Fortas concurring separately, Justice Harlan dissenting.
In this, the first United States Supreme Court case that accords a federal
taxpayer standing to sue to prevent the expenditure of federal funds for
unconstitutional purposes,3 the Court strikes down the bar to federal taxpayer suits that has stood unbreached since it was formulated in 1923 in
Frothingham v. Mellon.4 The future ramifications of this decision may be
far-reaching indeed, for wherever an alleged violation of a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power conferred by article I,
section 8, is accepted by the court, a taxpayer will have standing to challenge
the action of Congress. 5
35. In De Stefano v. Woods, 88 S. Ct. 2093 (1968), where the petitioner was convicted
of criminal contempt and sentenced to one year, the Court held that it would not reverse
state convictions for failure to grant jury trials where the trials began before May 20, 1968,
the date of the Bloom and Duncan decisions. Thus, neither Bloom nor Duncan is to be
applied retroactively.

1. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. In a recent case attacking a similar act, a federal district court required dismissal,
relying squarely upon Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Protestants & Other
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 473

(S.D. Ohio 1967).
3. In three taxpayer suits prior to Frothingham, the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction without directly examining the standing question. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 31
(1907); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.. 429, 438 (1906); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291,

295 (1899).
4. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
5. The Court suggests that other specific limitations besides the establishment clause
may exist, but declines to determine them except in the "context of future cases." 88 S. Ct.
at 1955 (1968).
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In Frothingham, a taxpayer sought to prevent congressional expenditures,
claiming that it had usurped powers reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment. The effect, she urged, would be "to increase the burden of
future taxation and thereby take her property without due process of law."
The Court disposed of this contention by noting that a taxpayer's interest
in the money of the Treasury is "comparatively minute and indeterminable ' ' 7
and that "the effect upon future taxation . . . [is] remote, fluctuating, and
uncertain." s Therefore, it was held the type of "direct injury" necessary to
confer standing had not been alleged. 9
Frothingham's bar to federal taxpayer suits had not been overcome until
this case. In the interim much debate had centered around whether taxpayer
suits are constitutionally barred by article III, section 2, or whether the
Court had enunciated a rule of judicial self-restraintlo The Court in the
present case favors the latter posture, relying upon statements in Frothingham
suggesting that the petitioner there was denied standing because of the small
size of her tax bill and because the entertaining of that suit might lead to
countless such suits "in respect of every other appropriation act and statute
whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity
may be questioned."' 1 These statements, the Court stated, suggest "pure
12
policy considerations."
While Frothingham denied a federal taxpayer standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal appropriation, the Court at the same time
recognized that municipal taxpayers may challenge the validity of municipal
expenditures. 13
In Everson v. Board of Education 4 the Court granted standing to a state
taxpayer who claimed that the first amendment, via the fourteenth, forbade
state reimbursement of parents for bussing their children to sectarian schools.
Although the Court rejected the claim, the issue of standing of the complaining taxpayer was never raised. The Court, however, in Doremus v. Board of
Education,held that the appellant in Everson was properly, if tacitly, accorded
such standing.15 In Doremus, however, the failure to show the "requisite
financial interest" resulted in dismissal because no true case or controversy
was presented.' 6 In both Doremus and Everson the federal judiciary allowed
6. 262 U.S. at 486 (1923).
7. Id. at 487.
8. Id. at 487.
9. Id. at 488.
10. Most commentators feel that Frothingham merely served as a rule of self-restraint.
See, e.g., sources cited by the Court, 88 S. Ct. at 1948 n.6 (1968).
I1. Id. at 487. The problem of a flood of litigation has been mitigated by the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where provision is made for class actions and
joinder. FED. R. Civ. P. 18-23.
12. 88 S. Ct. at 1949 (1968).
13. 262 U.S. at 486 (1923).
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
16. The defense that appellants lacked standing was raised, but was waived at pretrial
conference so that constitutional issues could be determined. The Court noted this waiver
and accepted jurisdiction without further discussion of the point. Id. at 433.
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'
a state taxpayer to attack "a law respecting the establishment of religion."'
This trend toward broader standing for state and local taxpayers has been
widely followed by state courts1 8
In the present case the Court sets out a new test for standing to assure
that the plantiff is a proper and appropriate party to invoke the federal
judicial power 9 that requires a federal taxpayer to demonstrate a two-pronged
nexus between his asserted status and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 20
First, a logical link must be established between the taxpayer status and the
type of legislation attacked.2 Thus, a taxpayer qua taxpayer will be a proper
party to question abuses of congressional power only under the taxing and
spending clause of article I, section 8, of the Constitution. The Court specifically excludes incidental expenditures for the administration of an essen22
tially regulatory statute.
It is this first nexus that causes Mr. Justice Harlan to disagree most
assertively with the majority. While he concedes that had Congress passed
a tax for support of religion, there would be standing, he distinguishes that
case from the instant one, where an expenditure is challenged. 28 He reasons
that once tax payments are received, they become part of the general revenues
and are indistinguishable from any other revenues therein. 24 Harlan condudes that where no such separate tax is involved a taxpayer cannot claim
a refund, cannot prevent collection of existing debts, and cannot challenge
the propriety of any particular level of taxation; 25 therefore, since his rights
and interests are held in common with all other taxpayers, no personal
26
interests are involved.
To satisfy the Court's second requirement, the taxpayer must establish
a logical connection between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. 27 He must demonstrate that the challenged
legislation somehow exceeds some specific limitation imposed upon the taxing
and spending power, and not that the legislation is generally beyond Congress's delegated powers. It is only when both nexuses are shown that the

17. U. S. CONSr. amend. I.
18. Jaffe, Standing To Secure judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. RLv. 1265,
1266 (1960). In about forty states it is possible to test the legality of local official expenditures; in at least twenty-seven states the same is true of state expenditures, and in nine or
more it may be possible to do so. Jaffe at 1280. Such suits have also been entertained by
territorial courts, Reynolds v. Wade, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957), and by courts in the
District of Columbia, (Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Jaffe at 1281.
19. 88 S.Ct. at 1953 (1968).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1954.
22. Id.
23. 88 S. Ct. at 1967 (dissenting opinion).
24. Id. See also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937).
25. 88 S.Ct. at 1967 (dissenting opinion).
26. Personal rights or interests are not always free from invasion merely because an
appropriate remedy is not at hand. Private litigants have often been granted standing as
representatives of the public interest. E.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.Q, 316 U.S.
4 (1942); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds,320 US. 707 (1943).
27. 88 S.Ct. at 1954.
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taxpayer will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy

28
and will be a proper party.

In the instant case, the taxpayer-appellant challenged legislation enacted
under the taxing and spending power (satisfying the first nexus) and alleged
that the substantial expenditure29 violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment3O (satisfying the second). She therefore had standing.
The new test for standing set out in the present case is consistent with
the Court's prior decisions. The appellant in Frothingham did not allege
that Congress had exceeded a specific limitation on its taxing and spending
power, but merely claimed that it had exceeded its general powers under
article 1, section 8; therefore standing would still be denied today.31 In both
Everson and Doremus, the Court would again grant standing under this new
test since in both cases the taxpayer-appellants alleged that the challenged
legislation exceeded the specific limitations on Congress's power under the
first amendment.
The test is also in accord with that stated in Baker v. Carr.3 2 Both require
that the litigant have a "personal stake in the controversy," 3 so that friendly,
3
hypothetical, abstract, feigned, or collusive suits will not be heard. 4
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it concerns only the party's
right to be heard rather than the adjudication of the substantive issues. The
"gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues....

35

The question is "whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether
' ' 36
the issue itself is justiciable.
Justiciability is broader in scope than standing and involves a dual
limitation placed on the federal courts by the case and controversy doctrine.3 This doctrine limits the federal judiciary to the consideration of issues
presented in a form capable of being judicially resolved in an adversary
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1954 n.23, which states that almost $1 billion was appropriated to implement
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The test established by the Court
does not specifically require that the challenged appropriation be "substantial." However,
by its inclusion in the text of the decision, the Court provides itself a basis for future changes
in the test.
30. The Court expressed no views of the merits of the appellant's case. Proceedings in
both the court below and in the Supreme Court were limited thus far solely to the question
of standing. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp.
351 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
31. 88 S. Ct. at 1955. A similar denial of standing would also be issued in a case such
as Tennessee Elec. Power v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), where only a tenth amendment
violation was alleged.
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. Id. at 204.
34. E.g., cases cited by the Court, 88 S. Ct. at 1953.
35. 88 S. Ct. at 1952 citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
36. 88 S. Ct. at 1952.
37. Id. at 1950.
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context (the standing aspect of justiciability) and, through a tripartite
allocation of power, 38 assures that the courts will not encroach upon areas
reserved to the other branches of government. 39 Separation of power questions
are concerned only with the substantive issues raised. Although the justiciability of the issues raised is irrelevant to standing, these issues must nonetheless be considered to determine whether there exists a logical nexus
40
between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan suggests solving the problem of standing raised in the instant case by permitting taxpayer suits to represent
the public interest only if Congress authorizes such suits.41 Although he
admits that no such authorization has yet been passed, he asserts that Congress may do so at some future date. 42 The protection afforded the taxpayer
under Harlan's solution is insufficient and is contrary to the basic judicial
principle first set out in Marbury v. Madison43 that the federal judiciary shall
have the power to review the constitutionality of the acts of the other two
branches of government without awaiting their permission to do so. Furthermore, should such standing be lacking, under the Constitution, Congress's
action to confer it would be to no avail. 44
It would indeed be surprising if the implications of the instant decision
were not greatly developed in future cases. The Court suggested that by
following the Frothingham rationale no taxpayer as such could question a
federal appropriation for the building of a cathedral for some particular
sect. 45 But now if the appropriation is assailed by persons of different religion
or no religion, then other factors besides, or possibly instead of, federal taxpayer status may have weight on the standing question.46 Perhaps the vital
interest of a citizen in the establishment issue, quite aside from his status
47
as a taxpayer, would be sufficient basis for standing.
Although the instant decision was limited in scope to giving standing
to taxpayers suing to enjoin federal expenditures that violated the specific
limitations of the establishment clause of the first amendment, the door was
38. Separation of powers questions are not clearly resolved even today. For example,
even after standing could be had under the holding of the present case, it is uncertain how
the Court would view a challenge to federal tax exemptions, such as the status of the rental
value of a home furnished to a minister. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §107. The same uncertainty would arise as to the church exemption on unrelated business income. INT. REv.
CODE Of 1954, §511. Would the Court consider the exemption as a positive legislative act

that is subject to judicial review or would it be seen as a failure to legislate, thus preventing
the Court from intruding into the area reserved to the Congress? See Church-State: A Legal
Survey 1966-68,43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 684, 735 (1968).

39. 88 S. Ct. at 1950.
40. Id. at 1953.
41. Id. at 1969 (dissenting opinion); see Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n
30 U.S. 127, 137-89 (1947).
42.

on the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Authorization of federal tax payers to sue was discussed but rejected during debate

challenged act. 111 CONG. REc. 5973, 6132, 7316-19 (1965).
6 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
88 S. Ct. at 1951 n.17.
88 S. Ct. at 1952; cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
88 S. Ct. at 1960 (concurring opinion).
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left open to grant standing in taxpayer suits that challenge the constiutionality
of other appropriations under other clauses. 48 It is possible that there are
other first amendment freedoms that may be interpreted as specific limitations on the taxing and spending power as well. The most obvious of
these is probably the free exercise of religion clause, which was also alleged
in the instant case to be a specific limitation. 49 It is likely that tax exemptions
to churches will be challenged soon, and while the litigant will rely upon
the instant decision he will probably allege both religious clauses in his
complaint.5°
Other first amendment freedoms might operate as specific limitations as
well. If Congress were to appropriate money to establish an Office of Government Censorship, the freedom of speech and freedom of press clauses might
be used to give a taxpayer standing.
It is presently unclear whether the specific type of limitation required
in the new standing test can be found elsewhere in the Constitution. It is,
however, a familiar principle that the whole of the first amendment occupies
a "preferred position" in our constitutional firmament.51 This position of
preference may lead the Court to conclude that constitutional limitations
other than those found in the first amendment are either unrelated to taxing
and spending or regulatory in nature; in either event they would fall outside
the requirements of the test. The Court's leaving the door open for future
expansion of the test, however, is a reflection of first amendment jurisprudence
and is interpreted as a move toward increasingly relaxed criteria for the
52
achievement of standing to sue.
STEPHEN A. ScoTr

48. 88 S. Ct. at 1955.
49. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, asserts that for the purpose of the standing
doctrine he can see no meaningful distinction between two religion clauses, 88 S. Ct. at
1964 n.10. The implication here is that the purpose of the tenth amendment is only to
provide for a division of power between the federal and state governments and not as a
specific limitation on congressional powers intended to protect individual rights.
50. The Court pointed out that the free exercise clause can be invoked only by a particular class of taxpapers. Id., citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). A
further problem will need to be bridged when a tax exemption is challenged: Is an exemption sufficient indirect support of a church as to be analogous to an expenditure for a
church? That is to say: Is an exemption a law in respect of religion?
51. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164, 167 (1944).
52. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (concurring opinion).
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